On the level of social theory, my distancing from Luhmann but my adherence to the insights of his early work is well illustrated by the analyses in the first volume, so that I did not need to go into them in more detail in this volume. With this turn, the stable structures of social formations were gradually pushed into the background in his writings and, in my opinion, a number of his earlier insights were lost. However, I did not follow Luhmann's theoretical turn, who increasingly oriented his analyses towards an autopoietic concept of systems from the late 1970s onwards. This train of thought goes back to Dilthey and Husserl, but Luhmann combined this train of thought with theories of complex systems, and I have used it in this form in my theoretical work. Reason, anchored in concepts, distinctions, patterns of action and norms, forms the specific material of society. Here, only the intellect and its anchors provide the material for stable organisational structures.
According to the starting point of Luhmann's theory, on the basis of physical and biological systems, sociality emerges as an independent system level through the mental systems of individuals.
In contrast to him, however, I have also tried to include the structure of domination in society in my social theoretical synthesis and to take into account the supra-legal determination of the ruling groups at the level of society as a whole in my analysis of law. I have based the social theoretical starting points primarily on the theory of Niklas Luhmann and accordingly understood society as a conceptual-systemic construction of comprehensive reality. In this volume, I have attempted to develop a comprehensive theory of law.
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